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REGULATING  COMPLACENCY:  HUMAN
LIMITATIONS  AND  LEGAL  EFFICACY
Steven L. Schwarcz*
This Article examines how insights into limited human rationality can improve financial
regulation.  The Article identifies four categories of limitations—herd behavior, cognitive biases,
overreliance on heuristics, and a proclivity to panic—that undermine the perfect-market regula-
tory assumptions that parties have full information and will act in their rational self-interest.
The Article then analyzes how insights into these limitations can be used to correct resulting
market failures.  Requiring more robust disclosure and due diligence, for example, can help to
reduce reliance on misleading information cascades that motivate herd behavior.  Debiasing
through law, such as requiring more specific, poignant, and concrete disclosure of risks and their
consequences, can help to correct cognitive biases.  Requiring firms to engage in more self-aware
operational risk management and reporting can reduce the likelihood that parties will over-rely
on heuristics.  And legislating backstop market liquidity and other stabilizing controls can help to
minimize panics.  Regulation, however, can only partly overcome these limitations.  Effective
financial regulation should therefore be designed not only to address these limitations but also to
try to mitigate the harm of inevitable financial failures.
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INTRODUCTION
Our limitations as human beings impose critical constraints on the effi-
cacy of law.  In a law school seminar in legislation, my professor would fre-
quently remind the class that laws will always be implemented imperfectly
because we are human.1
Since the 1970s, the field of behavioral psychology has been exploring
limitations on human rationality.2  Herbert Simon first outlined the theory of
“bounded rationality,”3 which posits that we cannot access and process all the
information needed to maximize our benefit.  The human mind therefore
“necessarily restricts itself” by relying on cognitive shortcuts.4  Around that
time, psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky began researching
the sources of bounded rationality and resulting cognitive errors.5  They used
the term “prospect theory” to describe their “attempt to articulate some of
the principles of perception and judgment that limit the rationality of
choice.”6  Among other things, they found that people frequently make deci-
1 Frank P. Grad, Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Seminar in Legisla-
tion at Columbia Law School.
2 See Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against
Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517, 1530 (2012).
3 See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Professor, Carnegie-Mellon University, Nobel Memorial
Lecture: Rational Decision-Making in Business Organizations (Dec. 8, 1978) (discussing
bounded rationality).
4 Herbert Simon, ECONOMIST (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/
13350892; see also Wright & Stone, supra note 2, at 1530.
5 David Z. Hambrick & Alexander P. Burgoyne, Opinion, The Difference Between Ration-
ality and Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/
opinion/sunday/the-difference-between-rationality-and-intelligence.html; see also MICHAEL
LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT: A FRIENDSHIP THAT CHANGED OUR MINDS (2017) (discussing
the relationship between Kahneman and Tversky).
6 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Mar-
ket Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 691 (1999) (quoting Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST
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sions based on intuition rather than reason, often reaching the wrong
answer.7  Others found that human rationality only weakly correlates with IQ
level.8
Behavioral law and economics adopted these findings, rejecting the
traditional assumption that economic actors are wholly rational.9  Recent
studies have shown, however, that rationality can be addressed and some-
times improved.10  Legal scholars are beginning to explore how regulatory
intervention can help to counteract irrationality and correct cognitive
error.11
Little has been done, though, about using these insights to improve
financial regulation.  Even in financial markets, humans have bounded
rationality.12  The only scholar who, to date, has considered how these
insights might improve financial regulation focused narrowly on consumer
finance.13  This Article, in contrast, focuses more broadly on how insights
into limited human rationality can improve (and thus references herein to
financial regulation include) both “microprudential” financial regulation,
which protects the stability of individual financial institutions,14 and
“macroprudential” financial regulation, which is intended to protect the sta-
bility of the financial system itself15 by reducing systemic risk.16
BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67, 88–89 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder
eds., 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 See, e.g., John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669, 670
(1996) (surveying the literature on bounded rationality).
8 See Hambrick & Burgoyne, supra note 5 (discussing research by psychologist Keith
Stanovich).  In the financial crisis, for example, sophisticated institutional investors suf-
fered from similar irrational tendencies as “widows and orphans.”  Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).
9 Choi & Pritchard, supra note 8, at 3.
10 Hambrick & Burgoyne, supra note 5 (describing a pair of studies published by psy-
chologist Carey Morewedge and colleagues that found that computer training led to
decreases in decision-making bias).
11 Barry Schwartz, Why Not Nudge? A Review of Cass Sunstein’s Why Nudge, PSYCH REP.
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://thepsychreport.com/essays-discussion/nudge-review-cass-sun
steins-why-nudge/.
12 Steven L. Schwarcz, Essay, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, 821.  During periods of economic quietude, for example, financial
actors grow complacent and underestimate both adverse and mundane low-probability
events. Id. at 822; cf. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW
HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM
(2009) (examining the role of psychology in economic decisionmaking).
13 See Oskari Juurikkala, The Behavioral Paradox: Why Investor Irrationality Calls for Lighter
and Simpler Financial Regulation, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 33 (2012).
14 See, e.g., Douglas J. Elliott et al., The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the
United States 6 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No.
2013-29, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201329/201329pap.pdf.
15 See id. (observing that the goal of macroprudential regulation “is to manage factors
that could endanger the financial system as a whole, even if they would not be obvious as
serious threats when viewed in the context of any single institution”); see also Daniel K.
Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Keynote Address at the Yale
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For ease of reference and also to situate human limitations within
nomenclature used to describe the range of market-failure triggers that can
impair financial regulation, this Article refers to those limitations collectively
as “complacency”17 in the expansive sense of that term.18  Complacency can
create market failure by undermining at least two perfect-market assump-
tions—that parties have full information, and that they will act in their
rational self-interest.19  These assumptions underlie financial regulation.20
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a taxonomy of compla-
cency, dividing it analytically into four categories: herd behavior,21 cognitive
biases,22 over-reliance on heuristics,23 and a proclivity to panic.24  Part II
explains how these categories of complacency can trigger financial market
failures.  Part III examines how insights into these categories of complacency
can improve financial regulation (and the Appendix to the Article provides a
compendium of potential regulatory improvements).  And Part IV analyzes
how law should address the inevitable failures that occur notwithstanding
these regulatory improvements.
Law School Conference on Challenges in Global Financial Services: Macroprudential Reg-
ulation (Sept. 20, 2013), in 31 YALE J. ON REG. 505 (2014); Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the 2014 Michel Camdessus Central Banking
Lecture, International Monetary Fund: Monetary Policy and Financial Stability (July 2,
2014); Frank Ahrens, Obama: We’re Moving Toward Broader Regulation, WASH. POST (Mar. 18,
2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/economy-watch/2009/03/obama_were_mov
ing_toward_broad.html.
16 Systemic risk is the risk that a cascading failure of financial system components (e.g.,
markets or firms) cripples the system’s ability to generate capital, or increases the cost of
capital, thereby harming the real economy.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J.
193, 204 (2008); cf. id. at 207–08 (referring to systemic risk as risk to the financial system
itself).
17 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 1441, 1443–46 (2016) (identifying those market-failure triggers as complacency,
complexity, conflicts, change, and a type of tragedy of the commons).
18 Complacency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/complacency (defining “complacency” as “self-satisfaction espe-
cially when accompanied by unawareness of actual dangers or deficiencies”).
19 Perfect Market Assumptions, FARLEX FREE FINANCIAL DICTIONARY (2012), http://finan-
cial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Perfecta¯rket+assumptions (discussing perfect-market
assumptions, including that market participants have equal access to information and are
completely rational).
20 See, e.g., Johan den Hertog, Review of Economic Theories of Regulation 2, 5 (Utrecht
Sch. of Econ., Discussion Paper Series 10-18, 2010) (observing that economic theories of
regulation generally assume that parties pursue their own interest, and that at least some
public interest theories of regulation proceed from an assumption of full information).
21 See infra Section I.A.
22 See infra Section I.B.
23 See infra Section I.C.
24 See infra Section I.D.  The term complacency is sometimes used as an antonym of
panic.  Recall, however, that this Article’s use of the term complacency is broader, encom-
passing rationality failure.  See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
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I. TAXONOMY OF COMPLACENCY
There is not yet a generally accepted way to categorize the limitations on
human rationality.  In analyzing behavioral limitations and law, however,
Professors Thaler and Sunstein discuss the limitations associated with herd
behavior,25 cognitive biases,26 and reliance on heuristics, which they call
“rules of thumb.”27  As shown below, these categories provide insights into
improving financial regulation.  This Article also proposes a fourth category:
the human proclivity to panic, which is strongly connected to the stability of
financial markets.28
A. Herd Behavior
Herd behavior refers to the tendency of people to follow what others are
doing.  That tendency is not necessarily irrational.  Herd behavior can
improve financial markets if a firm’s managers follow the behavior of other
firms whose managers have more or better information.29  Some even argue
that herd behavior may represent an evolutionary adaptation that allows indi-
viduals to take advantage of information gained by others.30  Herd behavior
becomes problematic, however, to the extent some followers may not be act-
ing in their self-interest or the interest of the party for whom they are serving.
The former tendency contradicts financial regulation’s perfect-market
assumption that parties have full information.31
For example, a firm’s managers might follow the behavior of other
firms’ managers, thinking the other managers have more or better informa-
25 See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 53–71 (2008).
26 See id. at 23–31.
27 Compare id. at 22 (“When we have to make judgments . . . we use simple rules of
thumb to help us.  We use rules of thumb because most of the time they are quick and
useful.”), with Juurikkala, supra note 13, at 40 (defining heuristics as “mental devices that
help to simplify cognitive tasks”).
28 See infra Section I.D (discussing how information overload can cause market partici-
pants to panic, triggering and transmitting systemic risk).
29 See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 265, 314 (2012).
30 See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads,
and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 152 (1998). Herd behavior can also be
rational to the extent a person chooses to neglect her own private information in order to
profit from the irrational behavior of others, such as an investor knowing there is a bubble
and profiting from it by selling her asset before the bubble bursts. See Dallas, supra note
29, at 310 (referring to this behavior as a collective action problem, an example of rational
irrationality).
31 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  The former tendency also contradicts the
game-theory assumption of rationality. See John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18
ECONOMETRICA 155, 155 (1950) (observing that game theory assumes that players are
“highly rational, that each can accurately compare his desires for various things, that they
are equal in bargaining skill, and that each has full knowledge of the tastes and prefer-
ences of the other”).
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tion.32  In reality, they may be following a misleading information cascade—a
convergence of action based on a belief that the prior actors have better
information, whereas the convergence reflects imitation more than good
information.33  An information cascade “has the potential to occur when
people make decisions sequentially, with later people watching the actions of
earlier people and from these actions inferring something about what the
earlier people know.”34  For example, early diners who arbitrarily choose res-
taurant A over nearby restaurant B “convey[ ] information to later diners
about what they knew.  A cascade then develops when people abandon their
own information in favor of inferences based on earlier people’s actions”—
i.e., that restaurant A is better than restaurant B.35
The people who follow the actions of earlier people are not mindlessly
imitating the earlier behavior; instead, they are “drawing rational inferences
from limited information.”36  The frenzied worldwide demand to purchase
certain highly leveraged mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the years prior
to the 2008–2009 financial crisis (the “financial crisis”) almost certainly rep-
resented, in whole or in part, the herd behavior of investors following a mis-
leading information cascade about the value of such MBS.37
A firm’s managers might also follow the behavior of other firms’ manag-
ers without recognizing that behavior benefits the other firms but not their
firm.  In this context, Professor Bainbridge observes that corporate managers
have engaged to their detriment in “participatory management”—involving
their employees in workplace decisionmaking—simply because they see
other companies doing so successfully.38
The latter problematic tendency—to follow the herd in order to protect
self-interest but not necessarily the interest of the party for whom the fol-
lower is acting (hereinafter, “defensive” herd behavior)—again contradicts
the perfect-market assumption that parties act in their rational self-interest.
Resulting in part from risk aversion,39 this tendency creates agency costs,
32 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing that scenario).
33 Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as
Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 993–94 (1992).  Information cascades may
partly reflect a “herd mentality” based on the somewhat unique nature of “financial assets,”
which “are not like other goods; demand tends to increase when they rise in price.”  But-
tonwood, What’s Wrong with Finance, ECONOMIST (May 1, 2015), https://www.economist.
com/blogs/buttonwood/2015/05/finance-and-economics.
34 DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING
ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 425 (2010).
35 Id. at 426.
36 Id.
37 See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
38 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational
Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1002–03 (1998) (observing that while par-
ticipatory management might “work[ ] well for a sub-set of firms, [it] is often adopted by
fad-following managers of firms for which it is poorly suited”).
39 See, e.g., Sam Ro, We’re Witnessing Herding in the Markets, and the Consequences Could Be
Devastating, BUS. INSIDER (May 21, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/sell-side-herd
ing-career-risk-bubbles-2015-5 (quoting GMO’s Jeremy Grantham that “[t]he central truth
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which are themselves a type of market failure40 that occurs when an agent
acts against its principal’s self-interest.  For example, a financial analyst (the
agent) may recommend a particular investment for his firm (the principal),
even though he is skeptical of its value, because other firms are choosing that
investment.  If the investment ultimately fails, the firm will be harmed, but
the analyst’s job and reputation will be protected by the fact that others, too,
chose that investment.41
B. Cognitive Biases
As a psychological coping mechanism, we often implicitly simplify our
perception of reality.  There are at least two common such cognitive biases:
availability bias42 and optimism bias.43  Both of these biases violate the per-
fect-market assumption that parties have full information44 by distorting the
internalization of information.45
Availability bias is the tendency of a recent or especially vivid event to be
the most readily accessible example in a person’s mind, such as overestimat-
ing the frequency or likelihood of an event when examples of, or associations
of the investment business is that investment behavior is driven by career risk . . . [which]
creates herding, or momentum, which drives prices far above or far below fair price”).
40 See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Financial Systems, Crises, and Regulation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 68 (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2015).
41 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1023, 1038 (2000) (discussing how herd behavior may have a reputational payoff even
if the chosen course of action fails, and arguing that where “the action was consistent with
approved conventional wisdom, the hit to the manager’s reputation from an adverse out-
come is reduced”); see also Dallas, supra note 29, at 319 (observing that managers who
invest unconventionally are more likely to lose their jobs).
42 See, e.g., Norbert Schwarz et al., Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the
Availability Heuristic, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 195 (1991) (noting that availa-
bility bias is “[o]ne of the most widely shared assumptions in decision making as well as in
social judgment research”).
43 See, e.g., Tali Sharot, Optimism Bias: Why the Young and the Old Tend to Look on the
Bright Side, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/optimism-bias-why-the-young-and-the-old-tend-to-look-on-the-bright-side/
2012/12/28/ac4147de-37f8-11e2-a263-f0ebffed2f15_story.html (“The belief that the future
will probably be much better than the past and present is known as the optimism bias, and
most of us have this tendency to overestimate the likelihood of good events happening to
us and underestimate the likelihood that bad events will come crashing down.”).
44 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
45 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
204–05, 207 (2006).  There are other cognitive biases, such as anchoring and status quo
bias.  Anchoring is the tendency of people to insufficiently estimate a quantity when they
“start with . . . [a] number [they already] know.” THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 23.
Status quo bias is a person’s “general tendency to stick with their current situation.” Id. at
34.  Because of the high level of technology used in industrial (i.e., nonconsumer) finance
and the industry’s intense competition and drive for innovation, those cognitive biases
appear to be only marginally applicable to the microprudential and macroprudential
financial regulation on which this Article focuses. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying
text.
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with, similar events are easily brought to mind, and discounting the
probability of an event’s occurrence based on the length of time since it last
occurred.46  For example, people with recently divorced friends tend to over-
estimate the divorce rate.47
Optimism bias is the tendency to be unrealistically optimistic when
thinking about negative events with which one has no recent experience, and
devaluing the likelihood and potential consequences of those events.48  This
bias helps to explain the reputed interpretation of the Delphic Oracle by
King Croesus of Lydia, who wanted to make war on Cyrus.  The Oracle
advised that the war “would destroy a mighty kingdom.”49  Croesus heard
what he wanted to hear50—that Cyrus would fall—but in fact, his empire was
the one destroyed.51
C. Over-reliance on Heuristics
Over-reliance on heuristics refers to undue reliance on explicitly
adopted simplifications of reality.  These simplifications can distort the per-
fect-market assumption that parties have full information.52
The heuristics category superficially overlaps with cognitive biases.
Indeed, availability bias is sometimes referred to as the availability heuristic.53
Logically, however, these categories should be distinguished by whether the
simplification of reality is implicit or explicit.54  Cognitive biases are simplifi-
cations of reality that implicitly occur as a psychological coping mechanism.55
46 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1366–67 (2011).
47 Id. at 1367 n.72.
48 Id. at 1366.
49 T. DEMPSEY, THE DELPHIC ORACLE: ITS EARLY HISTORY, INFLUENCE, AND FALL 70
(1972).
50 In this sense, optimism bias incorporates the concept of confirmation bias—the ten-
dency to interpret information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions.
51 DEMPSEY, supra note 49, at 71; see also id. at 71, 105–07 (discussing the historical
method of the oracles as sheltering ignorance behind a “studied ambiguity” and vague-
ness).  This same method of response is said also to be used today by fortune tellers. See J.
Barkley Rosser Jr., Alternative Keynesian and Post Keynesian Perspectives on Uncertainty and
Expectations, 23 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 545, 554–57 (2001) (arguing that uncertainty
leads to self-fulfilling mistakes).
52 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., April M. Perry, Comment, Guilt by Saturation: Media Liability for Third-Party
Violence and the Availability Heuristic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2003) (explaining that
the “availability heuristic causes people to overestimate the frequency of an event, resulting
in inaccurate judgments of the foreseeability of that event’s occurrence”).
54 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz & Lucy Chang, Essay, The Custom-to-Failure Cycle, 62 DUKE L.J.
767, 768 n.2 (2012) (differentiating availability and optimism biases from more formal
heuristic-based simplifications of reality that allow us to make decisions in spite of our
limited ability to process information).
55 See supra text accompanying notes 46–51.
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In contrast, heuristics usually refer to explicitly adopted “mental devices that
help to simplify cognitive tasks.”56
Heuristics are especially important in areas of complexity, such as com-
plex financial markets.57  Investors, for example, use rating-agency credit rat-
ings58 to help estimate risks associated with securities.59  Financial firms
routinely rely on mathematical modeling, such as value-at-risk (VaR), a
model for measuring investment-portfolio risk, to evaluate and report market
risk.60  Without reliance on heuristics, financial markets could not operate.61
Appropriate reliance on heuristics is thus rational to that extent.
Problems can occur, however, when there is over-reliance on heuristics.62
As will be discussed, senior manager over-reliance on VaR enabled secondary
managers to protect their self-interests, but not necessarily that of the firms
for whom they were acting.63  Similarly, investors often over-rely on credit
ratings instead of also engaging in their own due diligence.64  However,
changes in the financial industry, which occur frequently because of the
industry’s constant innovation and increasing complexity, can divorce credit
ratings from reality.65  Prior to the financial crisis, investors rarely questioned
the accuracy of credit ratings.66  Their faith was reinforced by the long
56 Juurikkala, supra note 13, at 40; see also Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 54, at 768
(defining heuristics as “simplifications of reality that allow us to make decisions in spite of
our limited ability to process information”).
57 Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 54, at 769.
58 Rating agencies make their business in carefully assessing the creditworthiness of
investment securities.  See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The
Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6.  Investment grade technically means a
rating of BBB- or better, indicating that full and timely repayment on the securities should
not be speculative. Id. at 7–8.
59 Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 54, at 772.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 769; see also James P. Crutchfield, The Hidden Fragility of Complex Systems: Conse-
quences of Change, Changing Consequences, in CULTURES OF CHANGE: SOCIAL ATOMS AND ELEC-
TRONIC LIVES 98, 102–03 (Gennaro Ascione et al. eds., 2009) (noting the increasing
structural complexity and fragility of modern markets, including financial markets, as part
of “the world we built”); Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45
GA. L. REV. 779, 799–803 (2011) (discussing the complexity of financial markets and the
bounded rationality of financial community members, as well as the need for heuristics to
process and analyze financial information); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke,
Complexity in Financial Markets 5–8 (Sept. 10, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://
scholar.princeton.edu/markus/files/complexity.pdf (noting that because financial com-
munity members have bounded rationality, they must simplify complex financial markets
by using, for example, models and summaries).
62 This over-reliance appears to be more easily seen in retrospect than defined or iden-
tified in advance, making it even more difficult to solve.
63 See infra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
64 Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 54, at 773–75; see also Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and
Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 227, 283 (2009).
65 Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 54, at 776.
66 Id. at 772–73.
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record that ratings had for reliably assessing the creditworthiness of relatively
simple debt instruments, such as corporate bonds and basic securitization
instruments.67  That unquestioning faith continued even when ratings were
extrapolated to new, much more complex and highly leveraged, high-yield
MBS.68
D. Proclivity to Panic
Financial markets can change rapidly.69  Sudden changes and the influx
of new information can cause an “information overload,” causing market par-
ticipants to panic.70  Market panic can also be triggered by new and worrying
information that cannot be verified.71  These influences can impair the per-
fect-market assumption that parties have full information.72
Panic can also activate a flight reflex, to remove oneself from a perceived
danger.73  Some engage in “collective flight,”74 which can undermine finan-
cial markets—such as causing a run on a bank that is solvent but (as is typi-
cal) unable to repay all of its depositors at once.75  Others respond to the
flight reflex in the manner of sauve qui peut, an “every man for himself”
67 Id.
68 Id. at 774–75; cf. infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text (discussing this type of
MBS).
69 Schwarcz, supra note 17, at 1445.
70 Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in
Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 820
(2010).  The conceptual biases discussed by Professors Miller and Rosenfeld focus on the
potential to interfere with accurate processing and analysis of information—what they call
intellectual hazard.  They identify three categories of such biases: complexity bias, incen-
tive bias, and asymmetry bias. Id. at 813.  Although they use different terminology, their
categories are not inconsistent with (and can be generally mapped onto) the categories
discussed in this Article: herd behavior, cognitive bias, over-reliance on heuristics, and the
proclivity to panic.
71 Cf. GEORGE J. BENSTON, REGULATING FINANCIAL MARKETS: A CRITIQUE AND SOME PRO-
POSALS 24 (1999) (discussing how the “opaqueness” of bank loans and assets leads to
depositor panic).
72 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
73 E. L. Quarantelli, The Nature and Conditions of Panic, 60 AM. J. SOC. 267, 269 (1954).
Psychologists believe that panic is a reaction to feeling out of control, which violates “a
basic human need.”  Anat Bracha & Elke U. Weber, A Psychological Perspective of Financial
Panic 9 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Pub. Policy Discussion Paper No. 12-7, 2012), https://
www.bostonfed.org/publications/public-policy-discussion-paper/2012/a-psychological-
perspective-of-financial-panic.aspx.  Panic may well be related to cognitive biases and herd
behavior, which are also influenced by the need for control. Id. at 9, 27; cf. ALEX PREDA,
FRAMING FINANCE: THE BOUNDARIES OF MARKETS AND MODERN CAPITALISM 222 (2009) (dis-
cussing panic as a driver of herd behavior).
74 Quarantelli, supra note 73, at 269–70.
75 See generally Dion Harmon et al., Anticipating Economic Market Crises Using Measures of
Collective Panic, 10 PLOS ONE 1 (2015).
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scramble that can disrupt organized procedures76—such as making it diffi-
cult to allocate lifeboats to passengers on a sinking ship.
Whichever way one responds to the flight reflex, a panicked person will
rarely attempt to deal rationally with the threat.77  That also distorts the per-
fect-market assumption that parties act in their rational self-interest.78
II. COMPLACENCY AS A TRIGGER OF FINANCIAL MARKET FAILURES
Having categorized the human limitations that can violate financial reg-
ulation’s perfect-market assumptions, this Part explains how those limitations
can actually trigger financial market failures.
A. Herd Behavior and Market Failures
Regulators, including the U.S. Office of Financial Research, have identi-
fied herd behavior as a threat to financial stability.79  Herd behavior can trig-
ger financial market failures in several ways.  In the years prior to the
financial crisis, for example, institutional investors around the world “became
euphoric about,” and stampeded to invest in, high-yield MBS.80  Many of
these investors were almost certainly following the herd,81 thinking other
investors had more or better information, whereas they all turned out to be
following a misleading “information cascade.”82  The increasing demand for
MBS drove a race to the bottom, motivating mortgage lenders to make and
then securitize poor-quality (including subprime) loans.83  A subsequent
76 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Creditor Panics: Causes and Remedies 14 (Research Notes in Econ. &
Statistics, Working Paper No. 98-4, 1998).
77 Cf. Quarantelli, supra note 73, at 270 (“[I]n panic behavior there is no overt attempt
to deal directly with the danger itself.  Instead, the only overt action taken is escape or
personal removal from the threat.”).
78 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
79 OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, ASSET MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 2 (2013),
https://www.financialresearch.gov/reports/files/
ofr_asset_management_and_financial_stability.pdf (expressing particular concern about
herd behavior that leads asset managers to invest in certain asset categories at the same
time).
80 Randolph C. Thompson, Mortgage Backed Securities, Wall Street, and the Making of a
Global Financial Crisis, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. BRIEF 51, 52 (2008).
81 Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a
Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011).
82 See MARTIN NEIL BAILY ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL CRI-
SIS 16 (2008), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11_origins_cri
sis_baily_litan.pdf (observing that information cascades and herd behavior “can go a long
way in describing how homeowners, mortgage originators, holders of mortgage-backed
securities, regulators, ratings agencies—indeed everyone—could get swept up in a bubble
that ex post was clearly bound to burst”).
83 See McDonnell, supra note 81, at 10–11 (stating that “[s]ub-prime mortgages to bor-
rowers with poor credit became an increasingly large part of the mortgage market”); cf.
Thompson, supra note 80, at 53 (explaining that as they became more economically suc-
cessful, MBS “became increasingly complex and much riskier”).
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decline in home prices caused many of the poor-quality loans to default,
resulting in credit-rating downgrades and MBS defaults.84  And that, in turn,
led to a systemic collapse of financial markets and of firms, like Lehman
Brothers, that invested heavily in MBS.85
Similarly, prior to the financial crisis, secondary managers (such as ana-
lysts and vice presidents) at financial firms engaged in defensive herd behav-
ior—following the herd in order to protect their self-interests but not
necessarily the interests of the parties for whom they were acting.86  These
managers typically were (and unfortunately, usually continue to be) compen-
sated for performing their assigned tasks, without regard to the long-term
consequences of the tasks to their firms.87  Notably, their firms paid them for
choosing profitable investments with low apparent risks, as measured by
VaR.88  “Secondary managers therefore turned to [high-yield] investment
products with low VaR risk profiles,” like complex MBS supported by credit
default swaps that other financial firms were buying.89
“The managers knew, but did not always explain to their seniors, that
any losses that might eventually occur would be huge.”90  The managers also
knew that if and when those losses occurred, they would be protected by the
fact that so many other financial firms chose that type of investment.91  And
indeed, when huge losses on credit default swaps and MBS supported by
those swaps triggered the systemic collapse that became the financial crisis,92
relatively few of those managers lost their jobs or were prosecuted.93
84 Thompson, supra note 80, at 55.
85 Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13
N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 61–62 (2009).
86 Steven L. Schwarcz, Essay, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 460 (2009); cf. supra notes 39–41 and
accompanying text (defining defensive herd behavior).
87 See Schwarcz, supra note 86, at 460.  The rationale for compensating secondary man-
agers without regard to long-term consequences to the firm is the belief that they “are
subject to supervision and management control by top managers, who in turn are subject
to the direction of the board of directors.  Top managers therefore are supposedly respon-
sible for ensuring, and thus monitoring, that the tasks performed by secondary managers
take into account long-term consequences to the firm.” Id. at 460–61 (footnote omitted).
88 Id. at 460.
89 Id.
90 Id.; see also Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 2, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html.
91 Schwarcz, supra note 86, at 462; cf. supra note 41 and accompanying text (making a
similar observation).
92 See, e.g., John Grgurich, Credit Default Swaps: Still Here, Still Able to Wreak Havoc, AOL
FIN. (May 11, 2012), https://www.aol.com/2012/05/11/jpmorgan-credit-default-swaps-
still-wreaking-havoc/ (“Credit default swaps were at the heart of the financial crisis.”).
93 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking and the Decline of Personal
Blame, 65 EMORY L.J. 533, 534 (2015); Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for
the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/
04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html.
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B. Cognitive Biases and Market Failures
These cognitive biases can combine to create a tendency to define future
events by the recent past.  That tendency can obscure rare events of extreme
impact, especially when the biases apply to a commercial activity that is seem-
ingly routine94—such as valuing collateral.95  The parallels between the
Great Depression and the financial crisis dramatically evidence how this can
trigger financial market failures.
In the years preceding the Great Depression, banks lending “on mar-
gin”—a practice in which borrowers use proceeds of a loan to purchase
shares of stock and then pledge that stock as collateral to the banks—
assumed they were adequately protected, even for margin loans made to risky
borrowers.96  Although these loans were not initially overcollateralized—
because the value of the pledged stock initially equaled, but did not exceed,
the amount of the loan—banks expected the stock market to continue rising,
as it had for decades.  That expectation reflects the tendency to define future
events by the recent past.  If stock prices had continued rising, the increasing
collateral value would have protected the loans.97  In October 1929, however,
the collapse in stock prices caused many of those risky borrowers to default
on their now-undercollateralized margin loans, contributing to the bank fail-
ures that characterize the Depression.98
Similarly, prior to the financial crisis, banks and private mortgage lend-
ers made loans to risky, or “subprime,” borrowers who used the loan pro-
ceeds to purchase homes and then mortgaged their homes as collateral to
the lenders.  The lenders assumed these loans were adequately protected,99
as did rating agencies and other parties who assessed risk on securities
backed by these loans.100  Although these mortgage loans were not originally
overcollateralized—because the value of a mortgaged home initially equaled,
but did not exceed, the amount of the loan—the parties expected housing
prices to continue rising, as had been the case for decades.101  That expecta-
tion again reflects the tendency to define future events by the recent past.  If
housing prices had continued rising, the increasing collateral value would
94 Cf. Susanna Kim Ripken, Paternalism and Securities Regulation, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 1, 17 (2015) (arguing that investors are taken by surprise and unprepared to react
effectively to a rare event of extreme impact).
95 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 1367–68.
96 Id. at 1356.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 1357.
99 See id. at 1359–60.
100 Cf. Dallas, supra note 29, at 316 n.373 (quoting Alan Greenspan’s observation that
“the data inputted into the risk management models generally covered only the past two
decades, a period of euphoria,” whereas the data more appropriately should have reflected
“historic periods of stress”).
101 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 1359–60.
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have protected the loans.102  In the fall of 2007, however, the collapse in
housing prices caused many subprime borrowers to default on their now-
undercollateralized mortgage loans, contributing to the loss of confidence
and institutional failures that characterized the crisis.103
C. Over-reliance on Heuristics and Market Failures
Over-reliance on heuristics can also trigger financial market failures.
Prior to the financial crisis, senior manager overreliance on VaR enabled sec-
ondary managers to protect their self-interests but not necessarily that of the
firms for whom they were acting.104  Firms invested in highly leveraged MBS
with low VaR, without senior managers realizing that in the unlikely event of
default the losses would be huge.105  The resulting losses caused many of
these firms to fail or to need a bailout.106
Similarly, overreliance on credit ratings can trigger financial market fail-
ures.  As discussed, prior to the financial crisis investors rarely questioned the
accuracy of credit ratings, often over-relying on them without performing
their own due diligence.107  This continued even when investment-grade rat-
ings were extrapolated to leveraged, high-yield MBS.108  Many of those MBS
ultimately defaulted or were downgraded, however, devastating the investor
community and contributing to the financial crisis.109
D. Proclivity to Panic and Market Failures
Panic can trigger financial market failures, historically epitomized by a
bank run.110  Professors Miller and Rosenfeld argue that the systemic shocks
that led to the financial crisis spread when panicked market participants
failed to properly acquire, process, transmit, and implement key risk-related
information.111  That information failure undermined “the healthy diversity
102 See Barry Ritholtz, Case Shiller 100 Year Chart (2011 Update), BIG PICTURE (Apr. 13,
2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2011/04/case-shiller-100-year-chart-2011-
update.
103 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 1360 (“When home prices began falling,
some of these asset-backed securities began defaulting, requiring financial institutions
heavily invested in these securities to write down their value, causing these institutions to
appear, if not be, financially risky.” (footnote omitted)).
104 See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
105 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
109 See Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 54, at 778.
110 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (describing a bank run); see also
Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 821.
111 Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 70, at 810.
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of viewpoints that tends to keep intellectual hazard in check during normal
times.”112
Thus, when the presumably safe investment-grade-rated MBS defaulted
or were downgraded,113 the resulting uncertainty and loss of confidence in
credit ratings as an indicator of risk caused investors to panic, fearing that
other highly rated securities could likewise default.114  Their fear was com-
pounded by the failure of regulatory agencies to quickly address the problem
or reassure market participants that the problem was isolated.115  The panic
caused a widespread collective flight by investors,116 in which they stopped
investing not only in MBS—which caused prices in the MBS market to col-
lapse even further117—but also in all debt securities.118  The resulting loss of
credit affected every level of the financial system,119 eventually reducing
spending and dragging down the stock market.120
III. REGULATING COMPLACENCY
Because complacency can trigger financial market failures, it should be
regulated—but how?121  Human nature cannot be easily changed.  Contrary
112 Id. at 820 (noting that “[t]he very definition of a panic is that everyone . . . comes to
evaluate market conditions in the same way and therefore rushes to reduce their exposure
to risk, creating a vicious cycle in which losses of liquidity trigger even more panic and
greater turmoil”).
113 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
114 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 211, 225 (2009) (discussing financial markets’ susceptibility to contagion and how
losses in securities with “investment grade” ratings caused investors to panic (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Preventing a Panic, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Feb. 1, 2008), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2008/02/
01/preventing-a-panic (arguing that “the credit system has been virtually frozen” because
“few people even know where the liabilities and losses are concentrated”).
115 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES 436–37 (2011).  The panic was thus caused by the type of information over-
load previously discussed, as well as the new and worrying information that cannot be
verified. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
116 Cf. supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing collective flight as one of the
typical responses to panic).
117 Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 225; Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 54, at 778.
118 Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 54, at 778.
119 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Bus., Duke Univ. Sch. of
Law, The Financial Crisis and Credit Unavailability: Cause or Effect? (Aug. 27, 2017), in 72
BUS. LAW. 409, 409 (2017).
120 Brendan Sapien, Note, Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Bucket Shops to
Credit Default Swaps, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 411, 438 (2010); see also DAMIAN TAMBINI,
WHAT IS FINANCIAL JOURNALISM FOR? ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN A TIME OF CRISIS AND
CHANGE 13 (2008), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21663/1/What_is_financial_journalism_for_
%28author%29.pdf.
121 A related question is when complacency should be regulated.  Thaler and Sunstein
suggest an answer: “people will need nudges for decisions that are difficult and rare, for
which they do not get prompt feedback, and when they have trouble translating aspects of
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to the pessimistic views of noted behavioral psychologists such as Nobel
Prize–winner Daniel Kahneman,122 some now believe that “[w]e have the
means to overcome some of our [human] limitations, through education,
through institutions, through enlightenment.”123  At least one scholar has
argued, for example, that certain “light-touch regulations” could help to
combat human psychological limitations in consumer finance.124  This Part
examines how insights into complacency can be used to redesign financial
regulation more broadly.
A. Regulating Herd Behavior
Consider how to regulate problematic types of herd behavior—when fol-
lowers of the herd are not acting in their self-interest or, in the case of defen-
sive herd behavior,125 the interest of the party whom they are serving.126
The first type of herd behavior is difficult to regulate precisely because it is
individually irrational.127  Regulators have also feared that attempts to regu-
late herd behavior could lead to regulatory arbitrage.128  To the extent it
results from misleading information cascades,129 however, herd behavior
could be regulated by addressing the cascades directly—such as by studying
how information cascades develop in order to identify and correct them and
reduce their occurrence.
the situation into terms that they can easily understand.” THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note
25, at 72.
122 Cf. Robert A. Burton, ‘Black Box Thinking’ and ‘Failure: Why Science Is So Successful,’
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/books/review/black-
box-thinking-and-failure-why-science-is-so-successful.html (book review) (discussing
Kahneman’s pessimistic view that the idea of human nature with inherent flaws is consis-
tent with the tragedy of the human condition).
123 Id. (quoting Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker); cf. supra note 10 and accompany-
ing text (referencing recent studies showing that rationality can be addressed and some-
times improved).
124 Juurikkala, supra note 13, at 51 (defining “light-touch regulations” as minimally
intrusive “default rules, framing and information disclosure rules, cooling-off periods, and
limitations on choice” (emphasis omitted)).
125 Cf. supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text (defining defensive herd behavior, in
which followers of the herd are not necessarily acting in the interest of the party whom
they are serving).
126 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
128 See Bartosz Gebka & Mark E. Wohar, International Herding: Does It Differ Across Sec-
tors?, 23 J. INT’L FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 55, 83 (2013) (“[T]he best policy
may be to refrain from regulating herding in selected industries; this would help to avoid
inevitable responses from the market participants (regulatory arbitrage) which would
potentially lead to suboptimal asset allocation, increased transaction costs and could dam-
age the market efficiency even further.”).
129 Cf. supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (observing that a firm’s managers
might mistakenly follow the behavior of other firms’ managers, thinking those other man-
agers have more or better information, whereas they are merely following a misleading
information cascade).
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In that spirit, Professors Kuran and Sunstein have argued for making
information on market conditions public, thereby reducing the risk of mis-
leading information being pushed into the mainstream.130  Among other
measures, they propose forming a congressional committee “entrusted with
compiling information about a wide range of risk levels and empowered to
set priorities.”131  They also propose creating an online “Risk Information
Site” to centralize accurate and up-to-date information on financial market
conditions.132  These measures implicitly assume that “informational cas-
cades can be reversed easily when an individual with precision of information
expresses his view publicly.”133
The validity of that assumption has not, however, been rigorously tested,
especially in light of the recent trend toward “fake news” and “alternative
facts.”  Increasingly, the stories that tend to be reported by the media, and
the online websites that receive the most views, are those that are “novel,
sensational, or emotional.”134  As a result, public trust in the accuracy of even
mainstream media reporting is at an unprecedented low.135  This calls into
question the public’s ability to differentiate precise and imprecise
information.
Requiring increased due diligence might help to strengthen the reliabil-
ity of market information,136 thereby reducing reliance on a misleading
information cascade.137  Members of a firm’s risk committee could be tasked,
for example, with reviewing market information to ascertain its reliability.
Recognizing that even institutional investors are subject to herd behavior,
Professor Dallas also proposes reassessing securities-law exemptions that are
based on investor sophistication.138
Defensive herd behavior may be easier to regulate.  Consider, for exam-
ple, the conflict of interest between financial firms and their secondary man-
130 Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683, 755 (1999) (discussing information cascades and pervasive misconceptions).
131 Id. at 752.
132 See id. at 755.
133 Louis Jaeck, Information and Political Failures: To What Extent Does Rational Ignorance
Explain Irrational Beliefs Formation?, 22 CONST. POL. ECON. 287, 297 (2011).
134 ALICE MARWICK & REBECCA LEWIS, DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST., MEDIA MANIPULA-
TION AND DISINFORMATION ONLINE 42–43 (2017), https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/Data
AndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline.pdf.
135 Id. at 40 (discussing a 2016 Gallup poll finding that Americans’ trust in the mass
media to report the news fully, accurately, and fairly was only at thirty-two percent, the
lowest in polling history).
136 See Dallas, supra note 29, at 362–63.
137 Cf. supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining that individuals in an informa-
tion cascade draw rational inferences from limited information).
138 Dallas, supra note 29, at 363 (“[T]he losses that sophisticated investors suffered as a
result of the financial crisis require a rethinking of exemptions.”); cf. Schwarcz, supra note
114, at 242–43 (“Government already takes a somewhat paternalistic stance by mandating
minimum investor sophistication for investing in complex securities; yet sophisticated
investors and qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) are the very investors who lost the most
money in the subprime financial crisis.”).
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agers.139  This conflict could be reduced by requiring secondary-
management compensation to be aligned with the long-term interests of the
firm.140  That could be accomplished by “retroactively recover[ing] [or ‘claw-
ing back’] compensation paid to secondary managers who have structured,
sold, or invested in market securities on behalf of the firm if, within some
time period, the structure proves inadequate or the securities turn out to be
poor investments.”141  Alternatively, “a firm might pay a portion of a secon-
dary manager’s compensation contingently over time or in the form of equity
securities with long-term lock-down constraints on selling the securities.”142
Another approach to regulating defensive herd behavior would be to try
to reduce the managerial risk aversion that motivates this type of herd behav-
ior.143  Incentive-based compensation makes managers more risk averse and
more likely to imitate other firms’ behavior, especially if a manager’s com-
pensation depends on how her firm’s performance compares to the perform-
ance of other firms.144  Subject to appropriate consideration of costs and
benefits, regulation might therefore be considered to discourage incentive-
based compensation contracts that are tied to such relative performance.145
It should also be noted that regulation itself can sometimes foster herd
behavior.  Because this type of herd behavior is neither individually nor soci-
etally irrational, it is only indirectly within this Article’s scope.  Uniform rules
on insurance-company holding of investment-grade-rated corporate bonds,
for example, have the potential to correlate an industry-wide dumping of
bonds that lose that rating, in turn causing a bond market collapse.146  To
discourage regulatory-motivated herd behavior, the government could treat
subjects of regulation differently,147 such as by offering market participants a
range of regulatory menus—e.g., “simultaneously offer[ing] a higher-price,
139 See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.
140 Schwarcz, supra note 86, at 465.
141 Id. at 465.
142 Id. at 465–66.
143 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
144 See David Hirshleifer, Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions, 22 FIN.
MGMT. 145, 154 (1993); see also Sushil Bikhchandani & Sunil Sharma, Herd Behavior in
Financial Markets, 47 IMF STAFF PAPERS 279, 292 (2001).
145 Cf. Bikhchandani & Sharma, supra note 144, at 293 (arguing that such contracts are
largely “inefficient, inconsistent with optimal risk sharing, and ineffective in overcoming
moral hazard and adverse selection problems”).
146 See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1596, 1602 (2014); cf. ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 1, 13 (Nicholas Mercuro &
Michael D. Kaplowitz eds., 2014) (arguing that regulations can create investment prefer-
ences for certain asset classes, setting the stage for asset bubbles and disastrous bank runs);
Peter O. Mu¨lbert, Managing Risk in the Financial System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 40, at 364, 395 (observing that financial regulation that
“causes banks to act in a (more) uniform way . . . will increase systemic risk”).
147 See Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Anti-Herding Regulation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2
(2015). But cf. id. at 7 (cautioning that regulators need to be sensitive about balancing the
costs and benefits of behavioral diversity and behavioral uniformity).
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lower-regulation alternative and a lower-price, higher-regulation alterna-
tive.”148  Menu-like regulation has been used in Delaware, for example,
where some incorporating entities “choose the lower-price close corporation
form while others opt for the higher-price, more responsive standard corpo-
rate form.”149
B. Regulating Cognitive Biases
Professors Jolls and Sunstein have argued that cognitive biases can be
regulated through an approach they call “debiasing through law.”150  The
goal is to give people more control over the process of information.151  Regu-
lators could engage in debiasing through law by making an event more “avail-
able” to individuals, such as by exposing them to a concrete instance of the
event’s occurrence.152
For example, smokers are more likely to believe that smoking will harm
their health if they are exposed to specific, poignant, and concrete narratives
rather than general information of health risks.153  Foreign cigarette package
warnings that are more pictorially graphic than U.S. text-only warnings have
been found to discourage smoking more effectively.154  In the context of
offering credit cards to consumers, Professor Juurikkala has similarly sug-
gested giving consumers “vivid—perhaps even shocking—information about
real cases that have gone wrong.”155
In making information more available, special attention should be paid
to framing the information, which can bias perceptions.156  Preferences are
not constant, and choice may be manipulated depending on the way the
information is presented.157  For example, people usually weigh losses more
148 Id. at 25 (“Menus that simultaneously offer a higher-price, lower-regulation alterna-
tive and a lower-price, higher-regulation alternative can induce regulated entities to sepa-
rate themselves based on whether the lower regulation is worth the cost of the higher
price.”).
149 Id.
150 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 45, at 200.
151 ROY F. BAUMEISTER & BRAD J. BUSHMAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN NATURE
155 (2d ed. 2011); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, People Prefer System 2 Nudges (Kind of), 66 DUKE L.J.
121, 131–32 (2016) (arguing that people are generally more receptive to requirements
that allow them to exercise flexibility and agency than to more cut-and-dried rules such as
requiring a display of graphics).
152 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 45, at 210.
153 Id.
154 See generally Hua-Hie Yong et al., Mediational Pathways of the Impact of Cigarette Warn-
ing Labels on Quit Attempts, 33 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 1410 (2014) (comparing Canadian, Austra-
lian, British, and American cigarette-package warnings).
155 Juurikkala, supra note 13, at 56.
156 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 36–37; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 45, at
210–11; Juurikkala, supra note 13, at 51.
157 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sion Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
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heavily than gains in evaluating potential risks and outcomes.158  Thus, a per-
son is more likely to choose to have an operation if told “[o]f one hundred
patients who have this operation, ninety are alive after five years” than if told
“[o]f one hundred patients who have this operation, ten are dead after five
years.”159
Social scientists have suggested additional debiasing strategies, including
changing optimizing choice architecture, changing incentives, and train-
ing.160  Changing optimizing choice architecture generally parallels the Jolls
and Sunstein approach of framing the presentation of information.161
Changing incentives focuses on making people more accountable for their
decisions by increasing the cost of making bad decisions or providing positive
incentives for making good decisions.162  Training focuses on helping deci-
sionmakers learn how to better process information and make more accurate
decisions.163
So what does that mean in terms of financial regulation?  It suggests, for
example, that regulators should consider making investor warnings in pro-
spectuses and other securities offering materials more concrete, in order to
reduce investor overconfidence (a form of optimism bias).164  Regulators
might also consider requiring investors to attend lectures that emphasize
these warnings and caution against overconfidence; supplementing warnings
with lectures has been shown to reduce investor overconfidence more effec-
tively than merely providing warnings in offering materials.165
Though less clear how to accomplish, overconfidence could be further
reduced by integrating independent perspectives into financial
decisionmaking.166
158 See Markku Kaustia & Milla Perttula, Overconfidence and Debiasing in the Financial
Industry, 4 REV. BEHAV. FIN. 46, 48 (2012).  This “loss aversion” helps to explain conserva-
tism in accounting, where profits are not recognized until they are certain whereas losses
are often anticipated and recognized in advance. See David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh,
The Psychological Attraction Approach to Accounting and Disclosure Policy, 26 CONTEMP. ACCT.
RES. 1067, 1074 (2009).
159 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 36; see id. at 36–37.
160 See Carey K. Morewedge et al., Debiasing Decisions: Improved Decision Making with a
Single Training Intervention, 2 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 129, 130 (2015).
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 See id. at 131.
164 Cf. Juurikkala, supra note 13, at 54–56 (arguing, in the context of credit card agree-
ments, that regulation should simplify the information presented to consumers because
“[c]redit card users . . . find it difficult to understand the complex terms and implications
of different offerings”).
165 See Kaustia & Perttula, supra note 158, at 47, 57.
166 Cf. HUMAN DIMENSION CAPABILITIES DEV. TASK FORCE, COGNITIVE BIASES AND DECI-
SION MAKING: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US ARMY 21
(2015), http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/HDCDTF_WhitePaper_
Cognitive%20Biases%20and%20Decision%20Making_Final_2015_01_09_0.pdf (arguing
for an outsider’s perspective to reduce overconfidence and facilitate more analytical think-
ing).  An obvious but costly and potentially awkward way of integrating independent per-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 21  1-MAR-18 12:39
2018] regulating  complacency 1093
Regulators should also consider trying to correct the market misconcep-
tions and factual errors caused by the availability bias.167  The financial crisis
may have been less likely to occur, for example, if regulators had required
stronger financial market awareness “that loans that are not initially overcol-
lateralized are inherently risky, given that a decline (or even a plateau) in
collateral” value could jeopardize repayment.168  Although some scholars
question whether government officials could identify market misconceptions
or factual errors that market participants do not themselves see,169 such iden-
tification is part of the core mission of the U.S. Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC), created by the Dodd-Frank Act.170
There is also a “meta” lesson about regulating cognitive biases.  The ten-
dency to define future events by the recent past makes it less likely that seri-
ous financial regulation will be adopted in good economic times.  During the
financial crisis, for example, everyone was focused on the problems at hand
and on how to avoid them in the future.171  But once a crisis recedes from
memory, few will want to sacrifice profits for the sake of regulation.172  A
spectives into financial decisionmaking would be to require one or more independent
decisionmakers.  Although not yet technologically feasible, future scientific advances might
even enable an integration of artificial and human intelligence in decisionmaking.
167 Cf. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 45, at 210, 228 (discussing debiasing).
168 Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 54, at 784 (making that argument).  When banks
made loans to subprime borrowers, lenders assumed they were adequately protected even
though the loans were not initially overcollateralized because they expected housing prices
to continue rising as had been the case for decades.  In 2007, however, housing prices
collapsed and many subprime borrowers defaulted on the now-undercollateralized loans.
See id. at 780.
169 Cf. Juurikkala, supra note 13, at 36–37 (arguing that regulatory debiasing prospects
are not very promising because public authorities’ track record of predicting crises is poor
and they have far less resources and incentives for doing so than the private sector).  This
raises a question of whether the private sector should be subjected to monitoring and
reporting duties.
170 See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 120 (2012),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf
(stating that FSOC “facilitates information sharing, coordination, and communication” in
order to “help identify risks, promote market discipline, and respond to emerging threats”
as part of its “central purpose[ ]” of identifying risks to financial stability); Randall D.
Guynn, The Financial Panic of 2008 and Financial Regulatory Reform, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 20, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/
11/20/the-financial-panic-of-2008-and-financial-regulatory-reform/ (observing that the
FSOC was created “to serve as an early warning system identifying risks in firms and market
activities, to enhance oversight of the financial system as a whole and to harmonise pruden-
tial standards across agencies”).
171 Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Bus., Duke Univ. Sch. of Law,
Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis (Oct. 24, 2008), in 60 S.C.
L. REV. 549, 553–54 (2009).
172 Cf. Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without Notice, BUS. WK.,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 34 (discussing that within years after the “Marriott split,” investors favor
higher interest rates over “event risk” covenants, once the examples of events justifying the
covenants have receded from memory).  “Bondholders can—and will—fuss all they like.
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normative framework for determining when financial market changes should
drive legal changes would help to counter this tendency.
I separately have proposed such a framework, building on a conse-
quence-based inquiry (CBI).173  Under CBI, the extent to which financial
market changes should drive legal changes should depend both on the con-
sequences of the market failures resulting from financial market changes and
the consequences of changing the law to correct those market failures.  This
inquiry is broader in several ways than traditional cost-benefit analysis (CBA),
which is currently used to assess regulatory changes.174  Whereas traditional
CBA assumes a decision, which may well be politically motivated, to imple-
ment specific proposed regulation if its benefits exceed its costs, CBI begins
by identifying a financial market change through proactive regulatory moni-
toring of financial markets.175  Regulators would then examine whether any
such change causes market failures and, if so, would assess the consequences
of those failures.  If those consequences are significantly negative, regulators
would be required to consider legal changes that could correct the harmful
failures, to examine the consequences of making those changes, and finally
to balance those consequences to choose the appropriate course of action.176
C. Regulating Over-reliance on Heuristics
Regulation can help to decrease the likelihood that parties will over-rely
on heuristics.  Regulation might also help to increase the accuracy of heuris-
tics.  Regulation should not, however, ban reliance on heuristics; when the
heuristic reasonably approximates reality, society benefits.177
To decrease the likelihood that parties will over-rely on heuristics, regu-
lation could require firms to engage in more self-aware operational risk man-
agement and reporting.178  Even a simple reminder that negative economic
shocks have occurred in the past can encourage more critical reflection and
accurate risk assessments.179  The Basel III capital-adequacy guidelines thus
But the reality is, their options are limited: Higher returns or better protection.  Most
investors will continue to go for the gold.” Id.
173 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Changing Law to Address Changing Markets: A Conse-
quence-Based Inquiry, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163 (2017) (analyzing why CBI could
improve the current ad hoc and politically distorted lawmaking process, which often
results in over-reactive or under-reactive legal changes that are made too late, after harm
has occurred).
174 CBI is broader than cost-benefit analysis in that CBI addresses not only the “how”
but also the “when” of regulation. Id. at 167–68.
175 Because CBI does not necessarily start with any specific proposal, it also avoids con-
firmation bias and is less subject to political distortions. Id. at 169.
176 See id. at 166.
177 See Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 54, at 769.
178 See id. at 783–84.
179 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 1389.
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require banks to engage in periodic financial “stress test” scenarios,180 in
order to motivate them to consider the possibility of, and to better prepare
for, future periods when previously adequate liquidity and capital resources
might prove inadequate.181  Officials from the Federal Reserve have similarly
touted these tests in creating a “strong, accountable, and proactive risk
culture.”182
Although less rigorous a reminder, the Dodd-Frank Act also requires cer-
tain systemically important firms to prepare so-called living wills,183 which are
resolution plans that “describe the company’s strategy for rapid and orderly
resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure of the com-
pany.”184  To the extent these plans effectively require firms to contemplate
their own mortality, they are reminiscent of the memento mori, an ancient
Roman tradition designed to increase a victorious general’s self-awareness of
his human limitations.  During the victory parade, a slave would repeatedly
whisper “memento mori” to the general—translated as “remember you will
die.”185
If these debiasing techniques are inadequate, regulators could also con-
sider banning over-reliance on heuristics.  The postcrisis attempt by regulators
to reduce reliance on credit ratings illustrates a partial ban.  Pointing to the
“hard wiring” of credit ratings in regulations as a main factor in systemic
disruptions and herd behavior, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an inter-
national body established by the G20 nations to monitor and make recom-
180 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAME-
WORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 46–47 (2011), http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs189.pdf.
181 See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 217 (2012).
182 Charles Evans, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Address at the Chi-
cago Banking Symposium: The Call for Proactive Risk Culture (June 3, 2015) (“It is incum-
bent on financial institutions to serve as their own first line of defense.  A strong risk
culture enables institutions to proactively identify and manage not only broad risks, but
also risks that are specific to their business.”).
183 See, e.g., Clay R. Costner, Note, Living Wills: Can a Flexible Approach to Rulemaking
Address Key Concerns Surrounding Dodd-Frank’s Resolution Plans?, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 133,
138 (2012) (“[O]bservers recognize living wills as a tool to limit systemic risk and
encourage prudential practices on the part of financial institutions before failure occurs.”);
Guynn, supra note 170.
184 Living Wills (or Resolution Plans), BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm, (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
Although the purpose of a living will is to reduce the need for a bailout, I have questioned
its effectiveness in achieving that goal. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool: Moral Haz-
ard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761 (2017) (arguing that a firm’s
failure rarely accurately reflects, much less closely resembles, expectations about the firm
when it was profitable, and also that living wills do not prevent the concurrent failure of
multiple otherwise systemically important firms from, collectively, having a systemic
impact).
185 Memento Mori: It’s Time We Reinvented Death, NEW SCIENTIST (Oct. 17, 2012), https://
www.newscientist.com/article/mg21628872-900-memento-mori-its-time-we-reinvented-
death/ (emphasis omitted).
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mendations about the global financial system, has called for reducing the
regulatory use of ratings, effectively requiring market participants to make
their own credit-risk assessments.186  The Dodd-Frank Act takes a somewhat
parallel approach.187
These attempts by regulators to reduce reliance on credit ratings illus-
trate, however, that a ban might be unrealistic.  Even if market participants
over-relied on credit ratings,188 it may be impractical to suddenly restrict par-
ties from using them.  Credit-risk assessment is essential, but it is very com-
plex; and most market participants, especially small- and medium-sized
financial firms, cannot afford the resources to adequately perform it.189
Even large financial institutions can find it difficult to perform their own
credit-risk assessments.190  Most market participants have little practical
choice but to rely on credit ratings for assessing risk.191
Because of these limitations, regulating overreliance on heuristics
should also focus on attempting to increase the accuracy of heuristics.  The
more closely the heuristic approximates reality, the less likely would reliance
thereon devolve into problematic overreliance.  Postcrisis regulatory attempts
to try to improve the accuracy of credit ratings, such as by increasing the
186 See FIN. STABILITY BD. (FSB), PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCING RELIANCE ON CRA RATINGS
(2010), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_101027.pdf?page_moved=1.  The FSB
proposes that government could keep tabs on firms by requiring public disclosure about
their credit-risk assessment approach and processes, including the extent to which they
rely on credit ratings. Id. at 1–2, 6.
187 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 931–939H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872–90 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 12, 15, and 22 U.S.C.) (restricting the use of credit ratings for regulatory
exemptions).
188 Credit ratings are not necessarily imprecise heuristics.  However, precrisis ratings on
certain complex and highly leveraged MBS relied on assumptions that, in retrospect,
turned out to be incorrect.  For different perspectives, see FRANK PARTNOY, RETHINKING
REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 5, 15
(2009); Nan S. Ellis et al., Is Imposing Liability on Credit Rating Agencies a Good Idea?: Credit
Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
175, 221 (2012).
189 See Francesco de Pascalis, Reducing Overreliance on Credit Ratings: Failing Strategies and
the Need to Start from Scratch, 91 AMICUS CURIAE 17, 19 (2012) (“It is unlikely that smaller and
less sophisticated investors can undertake the costs deriving from the set-up and develop-
ment of an internal risk assessment model and thus they will continue to rely on the exter-
nal credit quality information provided by CRAs.”).
190 Id.; cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mort-
gage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 405 (2008) (observing that “investors will almost cer-
tainly continue to overrely on rating-agency ratings, so long as the cost of making
independent credit investigations remains high”).
191 Cf. Andreas Kruck, Resilient Blunderers: Credit Rating Fiascos and Rating Agencies’ Insti-
tutionalized Status as Private Authorities, 23 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 753, 754 (2016) (“[D]espite
their fiascos and regulatory reform efforts, CRAs [credit rating agencies] continue to co-
determine access to capital markets and costs of borrowing for public and private debtors.
Investors still follow CRAs’ standard of creditworthiness . . . . CRAs’ status as transnational
private authorities has been surprisingly resilient . . . .”).
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transparency of the rating process and addressing alleged conflicts of interest
in the issue-pays model, reflect this type of regulatory approach.192
D. Regulating the Proclivity to Panic
Regulation can address the proclivity to panic by promoting market sta-
bility and calming the out-of-control feeling that activates the flight reflex.193
The classic example is a government guarantee of bank accounts to help
deter the collective flight of depositors known as a bank run.194
A market panic can also occur “when contractual counterparties rush to
try to close out their positions, causing prices to drop so sharply that one or
more capital markets stop functioning (at least temporarily), which in turn
leads to a vicious cycle in which investors lose confidence.”195  To help con-
trol this type of panic, the government could establish a market liquidity pro-
vider to invest in securities of systemically important markets in order to
stabilize prices.196  Governments might also consider suspending trading in
financial markets when prices are in a freefall.197
In principle, regulation that is designed to prevent panic ought to take
into account “the magnitude of the consequences and should apply only to
deter panics that trigger large consequences.”198  “Without such a sorting
mechanism, regulation can impede market growth or undermine the market
192 See, e.g., BD. OF INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, at A-2 (2015), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOS-
COPD482.pdf; cf. Gudula Deipenbrock & Mads Andenas, Regulating and Supervising Credit
Rating Agencies in the European Union 1, 10 (Univ. of Oslo Faculty of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper Series No. 2016-15, 2016) (discussing efforts by the European Union to
improve credit-rating accuracy by reducing conflicts of interest and making the rating pro-
cedures “more transparent”).  It is uncertain, however, whether these attempts will actually
improve rating accuracy. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 190, at 402–04 (examining the reasons
why rating agencies failed to predict the financial crisis, and observing that the “more likely
explanation . . . is that ratings are judgment calls by human beings, and mistakes inevitably
will be made”).
193 See supra note 73 and accompanying text; see also Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 215.
194 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.  In the United States, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), a government agency established after the Depres-
sion, provides this guarantee.  12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012).
195 Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 215.
196 See id. (arguing that “regulation might . . . provide liquidity to keep [the capital
markets] open” and also explaining how to accomplish that, through privatization, without
creating moral hazard); cf. Michael D. Bordo et al., Real Versus Pseudo-International Systemic
Risk: Some Lessons from History 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
5371, 1995) (observing that financial panic will not usually become contagious when a
lender of last resort provides adequate liquidity).  In the Great Depression, for example,
economists believe that the negative effects would have been considerably muted through
actions by the government central bank to provide the needed liquidity to maintain stabil-
ity within the monetary supply. Id. at 21.
197 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 1399–400.
198 Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 217.
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experimentation and innovation on which growth depends.”199  In practice,
however, identifying such a sorting mechanism ex ante is difficult.200  That
provides yet another reason, in addition to those next discussed, why failures
will be inevitable.
IV. ADDRESSING THE INEVITABLE FAILURES
Notwithstanding the best regulatory efforts, we do not yet understand
human nature well enough to fully solve the problem of complacency.  We
cannot even “anticipate all the causes of . . . panic[ ].”201  Prior to the East
Asian financial crisis, for example, “the financial markets did not signal
alarm.”202  Very few foresaw that a devaluation of the Thai baht would trigger
a panic leading to a regional financial collapse.203  As Alan Blinder, vice
chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1994 to 1996, observed, “These panics
can be set off by any number of things and spread in many wondrous
ways.”204
Irrationality can also exceed even the best regulatory controls.  Federal
deposit insurance, for example, has been a somewhat successful strategy for
reducing systemic instability caused by panic-induced bank withdrawals.205
During the financial crisis, however, depositors did not feel their funds would
be safe in any banking system.206
Because the financial system constantly changes, heuristics that approxi-
mate reality can easily lose their accuracy over time.  The regulatory
approaches to reduce overreliance on outdated heuristics, such as requiring
firms to engage in more self-aware operational risk management and report-
ing, are not guaranteed.207  Regulatory bans on using heuristics would be
counterproductive and unrealistic.208
For these and other reasons, preventative “ex ante” financial regulation
will almost always be imperfect.  Financial regulation should therefore be
designed not only to try to prevent systemic shocks from occurring but also to
try to mitigate their harm when they inevitably occur.  Although a compre-
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 216.
202 Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis, in CUR-
RENCY CRISES 105, 106–07, 119 (Paul Krugman ed., 2000).
203 Eduardo Porter, Shanghai What-if: How a Shock Can Become a Shock Wave, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2007), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9400E3DB1731F937
A35750C0A9619C8B63.
204 Id.
205 See supra note 194.
206 See James Bullard et al., Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, 91 FED. RES.
BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 403, 408 (2009) (“Although most money market mutual funds had
ample reserves and good assets, investors interpreted the troubles of the Reserve Primary
Fund (which held a large amount of Lehman Brothers debt) as a possible indicator of
problems at other mutual funds.”).
207 See supra notes 177–88 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 185–90 and accompanying text.
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hensive analysis of designing such ameliorative “ex post” financial regulation
is beyond the scope of this Article, scholars have separately engaged that
topic,209 arguing that such regulation should focus on trying to stabilize the
afflicted financial system after a systemic shock has been triggered and is
being transmitted.210  This approach takes inspiration from chaos theory,
which holds that in complex engineering systems—as well as in complex
financial systems—failures are almost inevitable.211  Therefore remedies
should focus on limiting the consequences of these failures.212
For example, ex post regulation could establish a liquidity provider of
last resort to help stabilize systemically important firms and markets that are
impacted by systemic shocks.213  Such a liquidity provider could also help to
stabilize prices in panicked financial markets.214  The costs of providing
liquidity could be at least partly privatized by assessing healthy systemically
important firms.215  That would not only reduce the taxpayer expense of a
bailout but would also help to control the so-called too-big-to-fail problem.216
CONCLUSION
Human limitations impose critical constraints on the efficacy of law,
undermining at least two perfect-market assumptions on which financial reg-
ulation is based—that parties have full information, and that they will act in
their rational self-interest.  This Article examines how insights into these limi-
tations can be used to improve financial regulation.
Human nature cannot be easily changed.  Contrary to pessimistic views,
however, we may now be able to begin to overcome some of these limitations.
For example, identifying and correcting misleading information cascades
and requiring compensation schemes that help to align managerial and firm
interests could reduce herd behavior.  Requiring continuing investor educa-
tion, including lectures, could help to reduce investor cognitive biases.
Requiring more self-aware operational risk management and reporting
might help to reduce overreliance on heuristics.
At present, though, regulatory responses to the problem of complacency
are primarily psychological and imprecise.  We do not know enough about
209 See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address
the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 92 (2013).  Ex post regulation can
also reduce the danger that policymakers will overregulate financial markets. Id. at 102.
210 Id.
211 See Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 248–49.  One aspect of chaos theory is deterministic
chaos in dynamic systems, which recognizes that the more complex the system, the more
likely it is that failures will occur.  Thus, the most successful (complex) systems are those in
which the consequences of failures are limited.  In engineering design, for example, this
can be done by decoupling systems through modularity that helps to reduce a chance that
a failure in one part of the system will systemically trigger a failure in another part.
212 Id.
213 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 209, at 102–22.
214 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
215 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 209, at 122–28.
216 See id.
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the causes of panics, for example, to even begin to reliably prevent them.
Financial regulation should therefore be designed not only to address behav-
ioral limitations but also to try to mitigate the harm of inevitable financial
failures.
Further research may help to reveal the biological basis of human limita-
tions.  Recent studies show, for example, that an individual’s inclination to
succumb to social pressure may have a biological origin and is not necessarily
a learned behavior.217  Observing corporate managers with the job of con-
troller, scientists have found that the inclination to yield to managerial pres-
sure is positively associated with what they call high mirror neuron system
(“hMNS”) functionality.218
Scientists are trying to find ways to try to manipulate that functionality,
which is governed in the brain, not consciously, but at the motor level.219
Although biological behavior is difficult to control, scientists believe that
hMNS functionality will ultimately be able to be manipulated.220  These types
of insights from the future exploration of the biological basis of human limi-
tations may help to improve the design of future regulation.  At the same
time, ironically, the power they provide to manipulate behavior may itself
need to be regulated.
217 Philip I. Eskenazi et al., Why Controllers Compromise on Their Fiduciary Duties: EEG Evi-
dence on the Role of the Human Mirror Neuron System, 50 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 41, 42 (2016).
218 Id.
219 See Giacomo Rizzolatti & Corrado Sinigaglia, Understanding Action from the Inside, in
ACTION SCIENCE: FOUNDATIONS OF AN EMERGING DISCIPLINE 201, 205–07 (Wolfgang Prinz et
al. eds., 2013).
220 See id. at 207 (finding that mirror neurons in the brain become active when execut-
ing an action, observing someone else execute that specific action, and in turn understand-
ing the experiences associated with the action).
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APPENDIX: COMPENDIUM OF POTENTIAL REGULATORY IMPROVEMENTS
This Appendix provides a compendium of how the Article’s insights into
complacency can be used to redesign financial regulation.
A. Regulating Herd Behavior
Herd behavior can result from misleading information cascades.  Regu-
lators, such as the U.S. Office of Financial Research, should consider study-
ing how these cascades develop, to try to identify and correct them and
reduce their occurrence.221
Requiring increased due diligence might help to strengthen the reliabil-
ity of market information, which would reduce reliance on misleading infor-
mation cascades.222  For example, members of a firm’s risk committee could
be tasked with reviewing market information to ascertain its reliability.
Because even institutional investors are subject to herd behavior, regulators
might also consider reassessing securities-law exemptions based on investor
sophistication.223
Aligning manager compensation with the long-term interests of their
firm (such as using retroactive compensation clawbacks) would reduce
“defensive” herd behavior, in which managers are not necessarily acting in
the interest of their firm and its investors.224  Discouraging incentive-based
contracts that tie the compensation of a firm’s managers to the relative per-
formance of their firm with other firms would make managers less likely to
engage in defensive herd behavior by imitating the behavior of managers at
those other firms.225
Regulators should also consider offering market participants a range of
regulatory menus.  That could help to discourage regulatory-motivated herd
behavior—exemplified by regulation requiring insurance companies to hold
investment-grade-rated corporate bonds, which can correlate an industry-
wide dumping of bonds that lose that rating.226
B. Regulating Cognitive Biases
Exposing market participants to specific, poignant, and concrete exam-
ples of problems caused by cognitive biases could reduce the effect of availa-
bility and optimism biases.227  Similarly, making prospectus warnings more
specific, poignant, and concrete could reduce investor overconfidence.228
221 See supra notes 79 & 129–30 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
223 See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes 150–64 and accompanying text.
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Investor warnings in prospectuses should be supplemented with lectures,
or other forms of training, which have been shown to even more effectively
reduce investor overconfidence.229
Regulators should also try to correct market misconceptions and factual
errors caused by the availability bias, such as by requiring stronger market
awareness that loans that are not initially overcollateralized are inherently
risky.  To this end, regulators should proactively attempt to identify such mis-
conceptions and errors.230
Regulators should consider normative frameworks for determining
when financial market changes should drive legal changes, in order to
counter the tendency to define future events by the recent past.231
C. Regulating Over-reliance on Heuristics
Regulation should be designed to decrease the likelihood that parties
will over-rely on heuristics and also to increase the accuracy of heuristics.232
Regulation should not ban reliance on heuristics per se; heuristics that rea-
sonably approximate reality are beneficial.233
Requiring parties to engage in more self-aware operational risk manage-
ment and reporting could decrease the likelihood they will over-rely on
heuristics.  This might consist of simple reminders, such as stress tests, that
negative economic shocks have occurred in the past.234  Living wills or other
resolution plans that effectively require firms to contemplate their own mor-
tality can provide additional reminders, not unlike the ancient Roman tradi-
tion of memento mori, in which a slave would repeatedly remind the general in
a victory parade of his mortal limitations.235
If self-aware risk management and reporting is inadequate, regulators
might consider banning overreliance on heuristics.  The postcrisis attempt to
reduce overreliance on credit ratings illustrates, however, that a ban may not
always be realistic.236
Regulatory responses to overreliance on heuristics should therefore also
focus on increasing the accuracy of heuristics.  The more closely a heuristic
approximates reality, the less likely would reliance thereon become
problematic.237
229 See supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
233 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 178–85 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 186–91 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.
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D. Regulating the Proclivity to Panic
To calm the out-of-control feeling that activates a flight reflex, regula-
tion should be designed to promote market stability.  This is epitomized by
the FDIC guarantee of deposit accounts to help prevent bank runs.238
Regulation could also promote financial market stability by establishing
a market liquidity provider to stabilize falling prices and by suspending finan-
cial market trading when prices are in a freefall.239
Regulation cannot completely prevent financial panics because, among
other reasons,240 regulators cannot anticipate all the causes of panic.241  Fur-
thermore, the potential regulatory solutions discussed in this Article are pri-
marily psychological and thus imprecise.  Even the best current regulatory
controls cannot fully control irrationality.
Regulation should therefore be designed not only to address behavioral
limitations but also to try to mitigate the harm of inevitable financial
failures.242
238 See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text (observing that regulators lack a
sorting mechanism to balance consequences deterred by the regulation against the poten-
tial of the regulation to impede market growth).
241 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 207–16 and accompanying text.
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